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Abstract 
This  paper  presents  a  tax-benefit  incidence  analysis  for  a  large  time  period.  The 
objective is to know if has been income redistribution across Mexican households 
during  the  last  twenty  years,  since  during  this  period  the  Mexican  economy  has 
suffered important structural changes and as well its public policies.  The analysis is 
based on four National Income Surveys, thus combining microdata, and inequality 
and  redistributive  indexes  was  possible  to  distinguish  the  progressivity  degree  for 
every kind of taxes and transfers, and once calculated the tax and transfers vectors was 
possible to have a redistributive net vector by decil. Thus, were calculated the net 
transfers  across  the  Mexican  families  after  fiscal  policies  and  its  inequality 
improvements. 
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Introduction 
The welfare state in Mexico is truncated by the conditions and context with which it. The institutions that 
constitute  the  welfare  state  system  were  created  in  widely  unequal  contexts  which  have  determined  their 
development.  Since a large share of the population has been excluded from the welfare state benefits, it is 
important to ask; if the welfare state system really is working? Or even, if a welfare state exists in Mexico? In 
accordance  with  the  performance  of  inequality  in  Mexico  is  important  to  know  if  the  social  programs  are 
working to minimize such inequality, due to in some cases some programs have been more inequalities than the 
national distribution income. 
 
On the other hand, to get a modern welfare state it is necessary to have as well, a modern and strong tributary 
system in order to obtain a high social expenditure. Otherwise the inequalities and distortions of the social 
budget will remain. Thus, it is impossible to have a solid and universal social security system without increasing 
the tax revenues in relation to GDP, which is currently 15% the GDP in Mexico.  
 
Then, this paper pretend to calculate the tributary weight per family (including direct and indirect taxes) and as 
well the total transfers (monetary and non monetary) obtained per family from social public policies. Thus, is 
estimated a consolidated vector to identify as the net receptors families as the net donors families and to know 
the “solidarity” degree across families, as well is pretended to know the equalization impact for the whole taxes 
and transfers and their effects on the family income distribution.  
 
2 Data treatment  
2.1 Income and expenditure of the families 
To estimate the income tax (IT), value aggregate tax (VAT), social security contributions (SSC) and special 
taxes (ET) before determining the income and expenditure of families. To obtain these taxes, were used micro 
data, such as National Income Surveys, “Encuesta Nacional Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares” (ENIGH) and the 
National Health Survey; Encuesta Nacional de Salud (ENSA). 
 
Since a panel for income surveys still does not exist for Mexico, several surveys were chosen to get a dynamic 
approach,  thus  the  issues  1984,  1989,  1996  and  2002  were  used;  these  years  coincide  with  important  tax 
changes. It is  necessary to stress that the family  is the “basic cell” in  this analysis, in this sense a family   3 
monetary income was built adding the whole monetary income concepts obtained per family and thus to get the 
IT and SSC. On the other hand the family monetary expenditure was calculated to get the VAT, ET and the 
house tax
2 (Predial).  
 
2.2 Microdata vs. Macrodata 
Once obtained the family income and expenditure reported by the national surveys it was necessary to compare 
and  contrast  against  the  National  Accounts,  as  clearly  the  surveys  are  underreported,  especially  the  family 
incomes. Such underreport was larger for business family income than for salaries family income, due to certain 
fears which exists due to tax retaliations. On the expenditure side, a certain underreport exists as well however 
less important.  Then to correct this fact the Altimir Factor
3 was employed. Previous to the Altimir factor several 
kind of families were distinguished to adjust income by income and to get a better estimation. In order to permit 
such differentiation, different underreports per each kind of income were taken in to account, otherwise the 
inequality could be underestimated. Adjusting was found around 50% underreported for income and expenditure. 
 
Table 1 
Deduction for the  Family Disposable Income 
Wage earning remunerations, Pensions 
Income like a Freelance (Self-employed)                                   + 
Capital and property Income  
(net surpluss, net combine income,                                            + 
interests,  dividends, income by properties rental) 
Social Benefits
1                                                                           + 
Current Tranfers                                                                          + 
 
Wealth and Income Taxes                                                           - 
Social security taxes
1                                                                   - 
= 
Disposable Family Income 
                                                
1 Tax based on the household value.  
2 Taking “E” like the value expressed by the ENIGH, and  “CN” like the value expressed trough the National Accounts, the factor is the ratio 
between these two values. Thus, the Altimir equation is expressed like: FA = CN/E. Therefore, if FA is big, will be greater difference 
between the National Accounts and the Microdata from the surveys.   4 
 
2.3 Family Income Concepts 
Before continuing with the analysis it is necessary to define the different family income concepts, which will be 
used to find the incidence on the family income distribution, the point is to know the income distribution before 
and after implementation of public policy. First of all the basic concept of Disposable Family Income (DFI) will 
be inferred due to the fact that the analysis will be dealing with this kind of income.   
 
Once (DFI) is obtained, it is possible to deduce the next income concepts.  Thus, through the Factors Income 
concept it is possible to find the income distribution without any kind (taxes or transfers) of public participation.  
To find the monetary benefits over the income, is necessary to take the Factors Income and to add the cash 
transfers to obtain the Income before Direct Taxes. 
 
Table 2 
Family Income Concepts 
Building the concept: 
FACTORS INCOME 
Building the concept  
INCOME BEFORE  
DIRECT TAX AND FINAL 
INCOME 
Building the concept 
NET FINAL INCOME 
DISPOSABLE INCOME  FACTORS INCOME  FINAL INCOME 
+ Directs Taxes  + Transfers in Kind  - Indirect tax 
- Transfers in Cash      
= FACTORS INCOME 
= INCOME BEFORE 
 DIRECT TAX  
= NET FINAL INCOME. 
     
  DISPOSABLE INCOME   
  + Benefits in Kind   
  = FINAL INCOME   
 
 
On  the  other  hand  the  difference  between  Final  Income  and  the  Disposable  Income  capture  the  impact  of 
Transfers in Kind, in turn  the Net  Final Income captures the indirect taxes effects over the family income   5 
distribution. Finally, the difference between the Factors Income index and the Net Final Income index, capture 
the whole effect of the Intervention State for the family income distribution. 
 
3 Methodologies for Tax Estimation 
3.1 Tax Representation   
Since the microdata obtained from the survey do not register any kind of taxes, it is necessary to estimate the tax 
burden per family. Thus in accordance with the national survey information it is possible to infer the majority of 
taxes collected, due to both the indirect and direct taxes contain between 90% and 95% of the total collected, 
giving a great representation for the estimations. 
 
3.2 Tax translation 
In accordance to the Pechman approach (1985), the next hypotheses for the different kind of Family incomes 
registered in the ENIGHs have been adopted: 
 
1)  The income tax (IT) is not translated, therefore is paid in accordance with the legal framework.  
2)  The VAT and the ET are paid completely by the consumers. For VAT exemption products, 50% was 
applied of the general tax, since the productive process is affected by the general tax rate. 
3)  The Social Security Contributions assigned to the employees, are not translated, and therefore are paid 
completely by the employees. 
4)   The Social Security Contributions assigned to the employers are translated totally; 1/3 to the consumers 
and 2/3 to the employees, this decision was taken though simulations exercises, which are close to the real tax 
collect.  
5)  Finally is assumed that benefits and profit taxes which come from business and corporation are paid 
directly by the owners.  
 
Possibly  the  hypothesis  number  (4)  could  be  controversial;  in  order  to  understand  the  tax  translation  it  is 
necessary  to  know some  facts.  For example  the  market  conditions  for the  employer  and the  demand  price 
elasticity for its products if the tax is translated to the consumers, as well the same arguments can be taken in 
account when the tax is translated to the employees.  
   6 
3.3 Direct tax estimation 
Once incomes are obtained after taxes reported by the ENIGHs, the current tax legal framework
4 per each kid of 
income was applied. Thus, for the person income tax different tax brackets were taken into account, tax credits 
and tax allowances per wage incomes. 
 
It is important to say that it has been practically impossible to take which the tax avoidance into account, as well 
as tax relief.  At the same time it was not possible to distinguish which people chose between the small tax payer 
system and the simplified system, in this case the general system for tax payers with professional and business 
activities was applied. It was only possible for the ENIGH2000 to apply the simplified system in accordance 
with  the  income  level.  Due  to  the  social  security  contributions,  differentiations  were  found  between  self 
employee and wage-earner, since only 0.7% of self-employee chooses pay social security contributions. 
 
Once the data base was filtered, the income before tax was calculated, taking into account the code tax per year. 
In this sense the next equation contains all the tax system characteristics: 
  
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ≡ − − + + − − − + ss b b b b b n e b cf Y ss Y Y Y cf Y Y Y Y ψ φ τ       (1) 
 






b − + + − −
+ −
=
ψ φ τ 1




Yb = Income before tax 
Ye = Income after tax (Net Income) 
ss(Yb) = Social Security Contributions 
cfss = Social security fees paid per the workers
5 
τ(Yb) =Income Tax Rate 
                                                
4 Per each study year, 1984, 1989, 1996 and 2002.  
5 Tax traslation   7 
cf(Yb) = Fix Income Tax Rate  
φ(Yb) = Tax subsidies 
ψ(Yb) = Wage Credit Tax 
 
The coefficients ss, τ, φ,  ψ, and the fix payments cf(Yb), cfss, were obtained using the “Income Tax Law”  ( Ley 
del Impuesto sobre la Renta) and the “Social Security Law” ( Ley del Seguro Social). Since the interest income 
is not accumulative with other incomes, to get the income before tax by this concept was applied simply the 
factor 1/ (1-τ), where τ is the tax rate. 
Due to fact that the national surveys are registered per capita incomes, the total family income was obtained 
since the basic unit of analysis are the families. 
 
3.4 Indirect tax estimation 
To calculate VAT, ET and House Tax, was used the family money expenditure reported by the different national 
surveys (ENIGHs), at the same time the families were classified by deciles in accordance wit their income level, 
and then to appreciate their burden tax. 
 
Finding VAT was possible aggregating the 15
6 different groups of household consumption.  Since the schedule 
tax, the Food & Beverages sector was sub-classified to distinguish between products with tax rate null, exempts, 
and general tax rate VAT (15%). It is worthy to say that a 7% tax rate to exempt products was applied, due to its 
productive process it is taxed with general rate tax.  Thus it is assumed that the tax is translated to the final 
consumers, by only paying the half of the tax rate.  
 
Finally to calculate better the total collection of VAT, the goods purchased between Mexico and abroad were 









                    (3) 
 
Since that the total expenditure is a sum of all kinds of goods for whole families: 
                                                
6 Food & Beverages, Public Transport, Clean Products, Personal Health, Education, Communications, Housing, Cloth & Shoes, Glassware & 







j i g G ) ( ,                   (4) 
 
Where j = 0, 1, 2, 3 … K are the expenditure groups. 
 
If Tij is the VAT paid by the i th family, per the j th good, then: 
 
ij j j ij d t b T =                        (5) 
 
Where: 
 bj = Price given by the producer 
dij = jth unities demanded by the family ith 
tj = VAT rate applied to the jth good 
 
Since the principal target is to estimate the VAT as exact as possible paid per family, the ith family expenditure, 
for the jth good is defined like: 
 
ij ij i ij T d b g + =                    (6) 
 
The equation is re-expressed because the term bidij is unknown: 
 
ij ij ij i T g d b − =                   (7) 
 
Combining this equation in 5: 
 
) ( * IJ ij j ij T g t T − =                   (8) 
 
Re-grouping and applying factorization is possible to get the whole quantity paid per family:   9 
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=                  (10) 
 
In respect to the special taxes estimate, once isolated the different goods are taxed using the same methodology, 
although these products are taxed with both kinds of taxes. 
 
4 Benefits Estimation Methodology 
The most of public transfers given to the families are Transfers in Kind; in accordance with the ENIGH-2000 
around 77% of whole transfers were made through Health and Education. While the Transfers in Cash basically 
in contrast with developed countries have a secondary role. 
 
4.1.1 Education 
Matching the student attendance at the Educative System and the whole educative expenditure per grade level 
the expenditure per student was obtained. Then, to get the public educative expenditure per family; first, the 
grade level was deduced using the students age; second, students and no-students were distinguished, finally the 
whole data base were filtered to distinguish between public and private schools attendance.  
 
4.1.2 Health 
The incidence exercise is supported through two National Surveys, the National Health Survey (ENSA-2000) 
and four different issues of the Households National Survey (ENIGHs), finally this microdata analysis was 
contrasted with the National Accounts. In accordance with the Mexican Health System there are basically three 
principal institutions, as well as several secondary institutions. The Health Ministry (Secretaría de Salud, SSA) 
with its hospitals network use to supply health care to people without any kind of social insurance, normally 
people who works in the informal economy. The private sectors workers normally are covered by the Social   10
Security Mexican Institute (IMSS), the public workers like the federal burocracy are covered by the Social 
Security  Services  Federal  Employments  (ISSSTE).  Once  each  institution  was  identified,  the  transfers  were 
assigned by head.  With base in the ENSA-2000 were built “shadow prices”, meaning that the costs of services 
supplied by the institutions were taken to obtain proxy variables. It is worthy to say that to get the expenditure 
per person the medical assistance probability by age and sex was used. 
 
4.1.3 Electricity Subside 
With the family expenditure reported by the ENIGHs their electricity bill and therefore the subsidy per family 
were calculated, finally the aggregated family information was contrasted versus the total subsidies reported by 
the Energy Ministry. Since only a small underreport was found, the estimation based on microdata is suitable. 
 
4.1.4 Pensions 
To calculate the transfers via pensions to the families, fist the institutional supplier (IMSS or ISSSTE) were 
identified using the respective national surveys income. Since the national surveys do not give any information 
about the kind of supplier, this information was inferred using the pensions amounts, thus in accordance with 
such amount the supplier institution was determined. At the same time the institution supplier simply matching 





To find the incidence, different income national surveys were used where only the public scholarships were 
considered,  thus  were  imputed  directly  to  the  families.  Finally  the  values  found  with  the  microdata  were 
contrasted against the national accounts. 
 
4.1.6 
Agricultural Subsidies Program (PROCAMPO) 
The agricultural subsidies were obtained directly from the income national surveys where the subsidies were 
attributed in accordance with the income tables. 
   11
4.1.7 
Antipoverty  National Program (PROGRESA-Oportunidades) 
These kinds of transfers were recently incorporated to the national surveys; in fact the program was created in 
the  late  90s.    These  monetary  transfers  are  conformed  by  an  education,  health  and  food  packaged.  These 
monetary transfers are conditioned to use schools and hospitals services.  
 
5 Families Income Disposable Tax Incidences 
5.1 The tax burden 
Once the family tax burden is estimated in accordance with the former methodology, the families were grouped 
by deciles for all the period studied. Such as can be observed in Table 3, around 50% of the whole tax burden is 
paid by the wealthiest 10% of families; in contrast the first five deciles hardly support 12% of whole family tax 
burden. 
 
By analyzing the behavior for the period it is possible to appreciate several changes in the family tax burden, for 
example between 1984 and 1989 there was a regressive evolution, due an increase in tax burden in the first seven 
deciles, making the burden lighter for the top three deciles.  
 
Table 3 
Decil 1984 1989 1996 2002
1 0.57 0.97 0.71 0.84
2 1.10 2.14 1.42 1.53
3 2.19 2.82 1.99 2.23
4 3.19 3.79 2.92 2.98
5 4.19 4.71 3.90 3.77
6 5.59 5.95 5.19 5.10
7 7.53 7.58 7.00 6.61
8 10.32 10.08 9.71 9.87
9 16.71 14.37 16.51 15.43
10 48.60 47.59 50.65 51.65
Note: The data were adjusted to National Accounts by the Altimir Factor criteria
Total Burden Tax per Decil
 
 
However from 1996 the last trend started to change step by step the top deciles and especially the last decile was 
retrieving tax burden until it reached almost 52% of the whole family tax burden by the year 2002. 
   12
5.2 Disaggregated Tax Distributions 
Taking into account the structure of tax paid per families, raising the last decil like the great protagonist on the 
income tax (PIT), it is noteworthy that the 10
 th decil has been paying around the 70-75% of the whole collection 
by this concept. In fact this prominence has been reflecting the high degree of income concentration in the last 
18 years, where 1996 and 2002 show a higher tax concentration. To answer this issue, during all this time the 
fiscal authorities have been implementing tax changes to minimize the negative impact for the family income 
produced by the economic crisis; therefore tax subsidies, tax credit and the tax rescheduling have been created. 
Table 4 
Decil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1984
Income Tax 0.12 0.29 1.12 2.15 2.97 3.81 6.19 8.16 13.75 61.44
Indirect Tax 1.09 1.91 2.77 3.46 4.48 6.12 7.88 10.72 17.35 44.22
  VAT 1.15 2.12 2.90 3.92 4.84 6.56 7.86 10.32 15.48 44.85
  Especial Tax 1.00 1.60 2.56 2.75 3.88 5.48 7.80 11.18 20.05 43.70
  House Tax 0.78 2.20 4.55 7.35 10.10 8.48 14.29 16.84 12.29 23.12
Soc. Sec. Cont. 0.00 0.48 2.86 4.75 6.10 7.99 9.53 14.03 21.47 32.78
1989
Income Tax 0.06 0.33 0.52 0.91 1.33 2.03 3.12 5.94 11.19 74.57
Indirect Tax 1.54 2.97 3.92 4.95 6.39 7.70 9.83 12.14 16.84 33.72
  VAT 1.67 3.25 4.03 5.00 6.26 7.87 9.82 11.78 16.26 34.07
  Especial Tax 1.38 2.58 3.77 4.89 6.57 7.52 9.93 12.69 17.57 33.10
  House Tax 0.63 3.57 3.53 3.31 6.06 4.64 3.52 8.38 21.39 44.96
Soc. Sec. Cont. 1.63 4.25 5.40 7.61 8.34 10.68 12.28 14.50 15.39 19.93
1996
Income Tax 0.13 0.19 0.42 0.70 1.37 1.92 3.37 6.33 13.93 71.64
Indirect Tax 1.34 2.35 3.05 4.17 5.26 7.09 8.93 11.35 17.62 38.84
  VAT 1.47 2.58 3.26 4.38 5.43 7.21 8.90 11.33 17.09 38.34
  Especial Tax 1.09 1.92 2.57 3.65 4.93 6.66 9.16 11.59 19.23 39.20
  House Tax 0.16 0.56 2.22 4.68 4.01 8.90 6.41 8.42 13.26 51.37
Soc. Sec. Cont. 0.53 1.81 2.78 4.51 5.80 7.39 9.82 12.64 18.98 35.74
2002
Income Tax 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.27 0.73 1.46 2.72 6.20 11.88 76.64
Indirect Tax 1.34 2.37 3.42 4.56 5.44 7.09 8.99 12.04 17.32 37.42
  VAT 1.42 2.44 3.36 4.50 5.43 6.93 8.69 11.32 16.39 39.52
  Especial Tax 1.23 2.31 3.60 4.56 5.57 7.26 9.15 13.07 19.03 34.21
  House Tax 1.13 0.85 1.03 8.12 1.75 9.80 18.78 16.02 10.15 32.37
Soc. Sec. Cont. 1.48 2.88 4.29 5.30 6.64 8.59 9.63 12.96 18.96 29.26
Elaborated with different ENIGH and Tax Lows
Percentage Tax Distribution per Decil
 
 
By the other hand, the indirect taxes have a strong concentration in the top deciles albeit less spectacular than the 
income  tax,  due  to  the  10
th  decil  only  paid  around  38%  by  the  year  2002.  However  in  this  case  the  tax 
concentration in the last decil has been decreasing, since 1984 paid around 44%. In accordance with the theory, 
these  kinds  of  taxes  show  a  smoother  behavior  across  deciles  than  the  direct  taxes,  because  the  family   13
expenditure behavior is lees cyclic and less concentrated than with income taxes. In this sense the indirect taxes 
have showed a less progressive trend. 
 
In respect to the social security contributions, it is also possible to observe the tax concentration. However, less 
than with income tax. Since the contributions schedules have boundaries as well contributions a smother path is 
followed.  In this sense less concentration is found in the contributions per top deciles, showing a regressive 
quotas system. In the Mexican case an important share of these quotas are founded by the Federal Budget and 
therefore by the whole tax system (Table 4). 
 
5.4 Concentration and Gini Coefficients 
To get the tax effect on the income distribution, first the respective concentration coefficients were obtained and 
later  have  been  contrasted  against  the  Gini  index  of  disposable  income.  In  accordance  with  Table  5  the 
concentration coefficient for the whole tax for every year studied is larger than its respective Gini index of 
disposable income. In this sense it is possible to stress that the whole tax system has a positive redistributive 
role. Observing the evolution for this period found that the gap between the concentration coefficients and the 
index Gini almost have kept stable except for 1996 where a less distributive effect was registered .  
 
Disaggregating by kind of taxes clearly is possible to see how the direct takes carry on the greatest redistributive 
effect by the kind of taxes. In contrast the indirect taxes practically do not have any positive redistributive effect, 
even worsening the disposable income because their concentration coefficients are smaller than their respective 
Gini index.  In fact, the whole distributive effect practically is supported by the income tax (PIT), since their 
concentration indexes are quite larger than their Gini indexes for disposable income. This behavior has been 
stressed during that time, because the concentration coefficient  values have passed from 0.7246 in 1984 to 
0.8488 for the year 2002.  
 
On  the  other  hand  the  social  security  contributions  and  the  rest  of  taxes  have  registered  concentration 
coefficients smaller than their Gini indexes, and therefore hardly have redistributive effects.  However the social 
security contributions and the house tax have increased their concentration coefficients in the last twenty years, 
giving a progressive tax effect. On the other hand the VAT has kept its concentration coefficient almost without   14
change. Finally the special taxes have registered an important decreasing on its concentration coefficient, passing 




Gini Index 1984 1989 1996 2002
Disposable Income 0.5002 0.5864 0.5230 0.5084
0.0087 0.0136 0.0103 0.0047
Concentration Indexes
Kind of Taxes 1984 1989 1996 2002
Whole Tax System 0.5942 0.6346 0.6178 0.5997
0.0169 0.0202 0.0097 0.0057
Direct Taxes 0.6056 0.6616 0.6397 0.6291
0.0179 0.0213 0.0107 0.0061
Indirect Taxes 0.4967 0.4573 0.5102 0.4794
0.0092 0.0067 0.0051 0.0037
Income Tax 0.7246 0.8230 0.8375 0.8488
0.0177 0.0156 0.0102 0.8488
Social Security Contributions 0.3530 0.3125 0.4762 0.4159
0.0105 0.0068 0.0055 0.0046
VAT 0.4869 0.4510 0.4970 0.4820
0.0103 0.0077 0.0061 0.0042
Especial Tax 0.5362 0.4730 0.5413 0.4738
0.0105 0.0065 0.0062 0.0042
House Tax 0.2647 0.5649 0.5653 0.4942
0.0242 0.0581 0.0770 0.0518
Note: Elabotared with different ENIGH issues.
Concentration and Gini Coefficients
 
 
5.4 The Tax Progressivity 
The Kakwani index captures the tax disproportion and its redistributive effect, thus a bigger disproportional tax 
means a bigger progressivity degree. If the tax is progressive, the value of Kakwani index will be big, keeping a 
direct relation between the progressivity degree and the Kakwani value. 
 
Analyzing the whole tax system, the Kakwani index found a lightly disproportion in favour to the lowest family 
incomes, then the whole tax system is hardly progressive next to the neutrality.  On the time, the index has had a 
constant behaviour, with 1989 like exception. This year the index decreased almost to the half (0.048), even   15
when the concentration index showing the highest value (0.634). A feasible explanation to understand such a 
decrease is the increasing inequality for the disposable income, since for that year the Gini index registered its 
highest coefficient (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 
Kind of Tax 1984 1989 1996 2002
Whole taxes 0.0940 0.0482 0.0949 0.0913
0.0119 0.0094 0.0090 0.0042
Direct Taxes 0.1054 0.0752 0.1167 0.1207
0.0131 0.0105 0.0098 0.0046
Indirect Taxes -0.0035 -0.1291 -0.0127 -0.0290
0.0062 0.0126 0.0081 0.0042
Income Taxes 0.2245 0.2366 0.3145 0.3404
0.0131 0.0066 0.0100 0.0045
Social Security Contributions -0.1472 -0.2739 -0.0468 -0.0925
0.0130 0.0150 0.0111 0.0063
VAT -0.0132 -0.1354 -0.0260 -0.0264
0.0066 0.0128 0.0077 0.0042
Especial Tax 0.0360 -0.1134 0.0183 -0.0346
0.0108 0.0136 0.0110 0.0051
House Tax -0.2355 -0.0215 0.0423 -0.0142
0.0435 0.0595 0.0774 0.0518
Note: The progressivity is respect to the Disposible Income
Kakwani Index for the Tax System
 
 
Disaggregating by tax, is confirmed the high progressivity for the indirect taxes, while the direct taxes show a 
light progressivity next to the neutrality. In detail, a less progressive tax system for 1989 obeys to the indirect 
taxes and particularly the special taxes have become regressives. While, the income tax (PIT) have showed 
higher Kakwani values year by year, as well the social security contributions have shown the same path, albeit 
much less progressive than the income tax, due to an important degree of regressivness in 1984. The data for the 
year 2002 has come close to neutrality. Though its behavior has improved, the social security contributions still 
continue to be the most regressive in the whole tax system. As well the VAT shows certain regressivity for the 
whole period, albeit close to the neutrality for the year 1996. Finally, both the special taxes as the house tax 
registered  certain  regressivity  for  the  year  2002,  even  during  the  studied  period  both  positive  as  negative 
progressivity were shown, and therefore have not followed a defined path. 
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To sum up, the progressivity for the whole Mexican tax system has hardly changed in the last 18 years, where 
the income tax and social security contributions have registered more progressivity, while the VAT progressivity 
has been almost neutral without changes  and  the especial taxes and the house taxes have lost progressivity.  
 
6 Families Benefits Incidence  
6.1 The Social Expenditure and Income Distribution 
Once  calculated  Transfers  in  Cash  and  Transfers  in  Kind  to  the  households  in  accordance  with  the  above 
methodology, the households were ordered by deciles using as criteria the Disposable Familiar Income, in this 
way the Table 7 was obtained. 
Table 7 
Decil 1984 1989 1996 2002
1 3.67 5.57 5.30 5.11
2 5.59 7.68 7.02 7.06
3 6.56 7.89 8.02 8.03
4 7.87 9.30 9.01 8.86
5 7.72 8.88 8.90 9.14
6 9.65 10.49 10.41 10.46
7 10.90 11.34 11.33 10.71
8 12.55 11.77 11.61 11.32
9 17.32 12.52 13.62 14.95
10 18.17 14.57 14.77 14.35
Note: Adjusted by the Altimir Factor
Total Transfers Distribution
 
In accordance with Table 7, it is possible to see more progressivity in 1989, simply because the last two deciles 
have lost weight (8.4%) in respect to the whole transfers, in contrast the fist two deciles have increased their 
weight almost 4%.  However the positive trend seems has been detained, due to the next years the transfer’s 
structure hardly changed. This unyielding attitude was enclosed with a high inequality income, since for the 10
th 
decil  is  receiving  public  transfers  almost  three  times  more  than  the  1
st  decil  (2002),  simply  with  this  fist 




6.2 The disaggregated transfers 
                                                
7 For the Spanish case, the transfer’s structure in 1989 was almost completely equitable, with the only exception for 1
st decile, which gets a 
little bit less than the rest deciles. Calonge and Manresa (1997).    17
Considering the disaggregated benefits, is evident the important weight for transfers in kind, especially health 
and education inside the social expenditure. By other side the monetary transfers are undeveloped though have 
been increasing in an important way  during the studied period.  Thus, while the  monetary transfers are the 
principal redistribution sources for the developed countries, for the Mexican case these transfers are limited to 
the anti-poverty program and non-contributive pensions since hardly exists unemployment subsidies or universal 
system pensions. Therefore can be deduced the anachronism and weakness of the “Mexican Welfare State” 
simply by the enormous importance for health and education inside the whole transfers, however has been a 
important correction of the social expenditure in favour to the poorest deciles during the last times. 
 
Thus, the educations transfers have been reduced for the 10
th decil almost 50% passing from 8.3% in 1984 to 
4.2% for the 2002 year. In spite that positive change, the top deciles still continue receiving bigger transfers in 
absolute terms than the fists deciles. The health transfers like second transfers source, have a more equitable 
structure across deciles, however as well is lightly regressive albeit has been developing toward more equality 
during the last 18 years, thus while in 1984 the 10
th decil received 2.6 times more than the 1
st one, for the 2002 
year, the 10
th decil received only 1.4 times more than the 1
st one. 
 
The rest of transfers in kind, like the electricity subsidy presents a very regressive structure, where its behaviour 
even has been worsening, due to for the 2002 year the 10
th decil got 13 times more subsidy than the 1
st one.  This 
illogical and absurd  subsidy  is emphasized simply observing that its budget is bigger than the anti-poverty 
program budget. 
 
Respect to the monetary transfers, is important to say that the pensions behavior has been quite dynamic during 
the  studied  period,  where  the  pensions  represented  18%  of  the  whole  transfers  by  the  2002  year,  this 
phenomenon is explained principally by the increasing ageing.  Taking account the formality job rate for the 
Mexican labour market and the profile of its workers, the pensions system is not progressive basically by two 
principal reasons, fist there are a high quantity of workers on the informal economy, and second because the 
pensions are contributive, thus the pensions system benefit privilege the higher incomes. While the pension’s 
structure across deciles improved during 1989 and 1996, 2002 presented an important deterioration, where the 
whole first five deciles got fewer benefits than the 10
th decil. 
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Table 8 
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1984
Pensions 0.15 0.31 0.54 0.46 0.32 0.67 1.31 1.97 3.01 4.76 13.49
Scholarships 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.07 0.07 0.85 0.31 1.71
Education 1.66 2.73 2.93 3.74 3.89 4.71 5.48 5.75 8.61 8.29 47.81
Health 1.86 2.55 3.07 3.67 3.51 3.89 4.03 4.76 4.85 4.80 36.99
Monetary 0.15 0.31 0.56 0.46 0.32 1.05 1.39 2.04 3.86 5.07 15.20
In Kind 3.52 5.28 6.00 7.41 7.40 8.60 9.52 10.51 13.46 13.10 84.80
Total Trans. 3.67 5.59 6.56 7.87 7.72 9.65 10.90 12.55 17.32 18.17 100.00
1989
Pensions 0.44 1.07 0.64 0.85 1.32 1.26 1.41 1.50 2.12 2.31 12.93
Scholarships 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 1.31 1.56
Education 2.14 3.02 3.46 4.31 3.81 4.88 5.44 5.52 5.79 6.11 44.49
Health 2.87 3.39 3.56 3.81 3.44 3.91 3.93 4.11 3.89 3.64 36.55
Electric. Sub. 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.49 0.58 0.70 1.20 4.48
Monetary 0.45 1.08 0.64 0.88 1.33 1.30 1.47 1.56 2.15 3.62 14.48
In Kind 5.12 6.60 7.24 8.42 7.56 9.18 9.87 10.21 10.37 10.95 85.52
Total Trans. 5.57 7.68 7.89 9.30 8.88 10.49 11.34 11.77 12.52 14.57 100.00
1996
Pensions 0.20 0.71 0.66 0.92 1.04 1.04 1.44 1.54 3.04 3.82 14.42
Scholarships 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.95
Agricol. Sub. 0.34 0.41 0.34 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.57 2.93
Education 2.66 3.41 4.30 4.93 4.68 5.76 6.18 6.30 6.55 5.59 50.36
Health 1.87 2.10 2.30 2.43 2.40 2.64 2.79 2.73 2.74 2.58 24.57
Electric. Sub. 0.17 0.29 0.33 0.42 0.51 0.59 0.66 0.80 1.01 2.02 6.78
Monetary 0.60 1.22 1.09 1.23 1.33 1.42 1.70 1.79 3.32 4.59 18.29
In Kind 4.70 5.80 6.93 7.77 7.58 8.99 9.63 9.83 10.30 10.19 81.71
Total Trans. 5.30 7.02 8.02 9.01 8.90 10.41 11.33 11.61 13.62 14.77 100.00
2002
Pensiones 0.60 0.66 0.74 0.80 0.76 1.45 1.85 2.80 3.29 5.05 18.00
Agricol. Sub. 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.51 1.53
Antipoverty P. 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.56 0.49 0.26 0.12 0.10 0.02 4.34
Scholarships 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.27 0.15 0.18 1.92 0.64 3.71
Education 2.09 3.26 3.89 4.40 4.70 4.99 5.18 4.78 6.23 4.22 43.74
Health 1.49 1.98 2.16 2.40 2.55 2.69 2.64 2.71 2.59 2.44 23.65
Electric. Sub. 0.11 0.20 0.27 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.50 0.60 0.75 1.48 5.03
Monetary 1.43 1.61 1.71 1.74 1.52 2.36 2.38 3.23 5.38 6.22 27.58
In Kind 3.68 5.45 6.32 7.13 7.62 8.10 8.33 8.09 9.57 8.13 72.42
Total Trans. 5.11 7.06 8.03 8.86 9.14 10.46 10.71 11.32 14.95 14.35 100.00
Elaborated withe ENIGH and National Account data
Disagregated Distribution for Public Transfers 
 
The scholarships have showed a poor performance during the time, due to hardly have changed its structure 
across deciles.  Though by 2002 has improved the participation for the fist deciles, the amount destined to this 
concept inside the whole transfers are still very low. 
 
The agricultural subsidies program (PROCAMPO), have had a poor behavior from the redistributive point of 
view, due to have changed from a position lightly progressivity in 1996 to the proportionality in 2002, favoring 
especially the 10
th decil.   Finally the anti-poverty program has been the most redistributive across the whole 
transfers with a strong redistributive profile since the 1
st decile get 43 times more transfers than the 10
th, the   19
principal handicap is its low budget due to only represents 4.3% of the whole transfers, which is even smaller 
than the electricity subsidies which one is highly unequal.  
 
6.3 Concentration and Gini Coefficients 
In contrast to the tax analysis, a small concentration index means a better distributive effect, in fact when the 
coefficients become negatives the distributive effect is absolutely positive, concentrating the transfers on the first 
deciles. 
 
In  general  has  increased  the  progressivity  for  the  whole  benefits  during  the  analyzed  period  (Table  9).  
Disaggregating, the transfers in kind have had a better performance that the monetary transfers, since the fist one 
have reduced its coefficient 64% while the second one only have reduced 43% its coefficient between the initial 
and final year. 
 
The behavior per kind of benefits is the next; the educative transfers have had an impressive performance with a 
sharp  fall  in its index  (116%), thus  the  public  educative  expenditure has improved  its  redistributive  focus, 
showing a more fair expenditure and supporting the fist deciles, however such performance still has not turned 
completely  equable  the  educative  expenditure,  because  while  the  index  be  positive,  the  transfers  continue 
supporting more the high medium and top deciles than the lower deciles. 
 
Respect to the health aggregated transfers, as well has been a better performance because the concentration 
coefficients have decreased becoming almost neutrals. The health system like a whole presents a light bias 
toward the progressivity, especially supported by the national health services of the Health Ministry (SSA), since 
its universal services use to supply medical services to people without a job inside the formal market labour. 
8 
 
In contrast,  the  concentration  coefficients for pensions  have  the  highest  values,  although  smaller  than  their 
respective Gini indexes, in this case the highly unequal income distribution permits a positive distributive effect 
to the pensions. So, is important to stress than the positive redistributive effect obey to high inequality and not to 
the redistributive attributes of the pension system. 
 
                                                
8 When the health transfers are analyzed by kind of institution, the differences among institutions become important.   20
Respect the scholarships transfers, in accordance with the evolution of its concentration indexes has been an 
important improved due to the fist years the system was highly regressive, while for 2002 the system became 
more progressive. However, is important to say that 1996 registered the best performance, where the system was 




Gini Index 1984 1989 1996 2002
Disposable Income 0.5002 0.5864 0.5230 0.5084
0.0087 0.0136 0.0103 0.0047
Concentration Indexes
Kind of Transfers 1984 1989 1996 2002
Whole Transfers 0.2334 0.1561 0.1793 0.1589
0.0084 0.0048 0.0049 0.0046
In Kind 0.2197 0.1409 0.1586 0.1333
0.0078 0.0042 0.0045 0.0042
Monetary 0.3974 0.2776 0.3281 0.2760
0.0522 0.0251 0.0198 0.0148
Education 0.2476 0.1747 0.1410 0.1146
0.0089 0.0048 0.0064 0.0056
Health 0.1096 0.0424 0.0615 0.0648
-0.0060 0.0035 0.0028 0.0027
Pensions 0.3823 0.2660 0.3986 0.4147
0.0556 0.0247 0.0223 0.0175
Scholarships 0.6596 0.6980 0.0956 0.3523
0.0618 0.1296 0.0646 0.0424
Electricity Subsisdies 0.3657 0.3773 0.3786
0.0095 0.0090 0.0077




Note: Elaborated with different ENIGHs issues.
Cocentration and Gini Indexes for Households
 
Finally the electricity subsidies show some of the higher concentration index across the whole transfers,  where 
the top deciles get the bigger transfers, but even worse still today has not exist the most minim change on its 
structure.  By other side the agricultural subsidies have had as well a bad performance; due to its concentration 
coefficients have showed a larger concentration  on the  higher income deciles.   In contrast the anti-poverty   21
program got the lowest concentration coefficient among all the transfers and therefore is the most progressive 
benefit to the Mexican families. 
 
6.4 The Benefits Progressivity 
For the benefits progressivity analysis as well was used the Kakwani index to calculate the disproportional 
degree of each one of the transfers.  In accordance with this index, the whole transfers have increased the 
progressivity degree around 31% during the last 18 years, however in spite this advance the highest progressivity 
was registered for the 1989 year.  
 
Table 10 
Kind of Transfers 1984 1989 1996 2002
Whole Transfers 0.2667 0.4303 0.3437 0.3495
0.0116 0.0143 0.0111 0.0064
In Kind 0.2805 0.4455 0.3643 0.3751
0.0114 0.0142 0.0109 0.0062
Monetary 0.1027 0.3088 0.1948 0.2324
0.0525 0.0284 0.0223 0.0154
Education 0.2525 0.4149 0.3819 0.3938
0.0121 0.0144 0.0121 0.0074
Health 0.3906 0.5441 0.4616 0.4436
0.0104 0.0140 0.0107 0.0054
Pensions 0.1179 0.3204 0.1244 0.0937
0.0557 0.0821 0.0247 0.0181
Scholarships -0.1594 -0.1116 0.4274 0.1561
0.0629 0.1301 0.0653 0.0426
Electricity Subsisdies 0.2207 0.1456 0.1298
0.0142 0.0126 0.0079




Note: The transfers progressivity is respect the Disposable Income
Kakwani Index per Transfers
 
The Transfers in Kind showed the highest progressivity indexes; however the monetary transfers were more 
dynamics, due to its index grew 126%
9 while the transfers in kind only grew its progressivity 33%. 
 
                                                
9 Is important to say that the last national household surveys issues have incorporated more monetary transfers and that’s why has augmented 
its importance between the whole transfers.   22
Disaggregating, the educative transfers have had good performance since its progressivity index increased 56% 
during the time period showing a value of 0.393 for the 2002 year. By its side the health transfers have had a 
good  behavior  albeit  lower  than  the  educative  transfers,  however  registered  for  the  last  year  a  higher 
progressivity value.  
 
In contrast, the progressivity degrees for pensions have been diminishing with a index value 20% smaller for the 
final year studied. While the progressivity degree for scholarships has became positive, is still so low.  By other 
side the electricity subsidy has lost an important degree of progressivity (almost 40%) reflecting a logical absurd. 
In the same sense the agricultural subsidies lost 20% of progressivity, while the antipoverty program confirms 
the highest progressivity degree with a value for the Kakwani index of 0.799. 
  
Thus, is possible to classify the transfers by the progressivity degree in two groups, fist for all the benefits which 
its progressivity degree is above the level for the whole aggregated transfers, in this case there are education, 
health, the agricultural subsidies and the antipoverty national program. On the second group there are pensions, 
scholarships and electricity subsidies which registered a progressivity degree under the whole transfers. 
 
In general after the Kakwani index analysis is found that the transfers in absolute terms are doing much more 
benefits to the top deciles, but the high inequality for the income distribution, favor relative distributive effects, 
spite in of some transfers registered really poor progresivities degrees.  
 
7 The total distributive effect 
 To have a complete fiscal incidence analysis is necessary to get both as tax incidence as benefit incidence 
analysis.  Here both were calculated already, therefore now will be obtained a consolidated of the net tax balance 
and the net social expenditure. In this sense will be quantified the whole redistributive impact for the family 
income distribution, thus will be possible to identify by decil the net receptors and the net contributors and to 
calculate the quantity transferred across deciles. 
 
7.1 The family income evolution 
To evaluate the public policies redistributive effects for the different kind of incomes, will be used the Reynolds-
Smolensky redistributive index. Thus, the basic income concept is the Factors Income or income without any   23
public intervention while on the extreme is the Final Income after Indirect Taxes, thus the difference between 
both incomes will be the whole public policies redistributive effects on the family income. Following the next 
diagram for the different income concepts will make easier the analysis comprehension. 
 
Factors Income
10 → Income before Direct Taxes
11 → Disposable Income
 12 → 
 
Final Income
13 → Final Income after Indirect Taxes
14 
 
The difference between the first and last kind of income will be captured by the net distribution vector, which is 
the difference between the benefits received and the tax paid by the families. In the same way, studying the 
intermediate concepts between both incomes is possible to know the isolate effect for benefits and taxes.  
 
7.2 The redistributive effect 
In accordance with the Table 4.3 is possible to see a whole positive redistributive effect for every one of the 
studied years, with an increasing improving registered on the last column of the table, where the Normalized 
Reynolds-Smolensky index confirm an improving for the family distribution income between 9% and 12%. 
Though  this  values  show  a  positive  dynamic  with  higher  values  for  the  last  years,  at  the  same  time  such 
improving could be insufficient given the high inequality income distribution across the Mexican families.
15  
 
Analyzing the four aggregated elements which have affected the family income distribution, the Transfers in 
Kind are the most redistributive (except for 1984) supporting 60% of the whole redistributive effect.  The direct 
taxes  arise  like  the  second  redistribution  source,  explaining  around  30%  of  the  redistributive  effect.  This 
protagonist  role  is  possible  by  the  highly  unequal  income  distribution,  making  the  personal  tax  highly 
redistributive.
16  
    
Respect the monetary transfers; its performance has improved significant during the last 18  years, however 
continue like the 3
rd redistributive source. Contributing with only 11.7% on the whole redistributive impact, 
                                                
10 Factors Income =  Disposable Income + Direct Taxes – Monetary Transfers 
11 Income before Direct Taxes  = Factors Income + Monetary Transfers 
12 Disposable Income = Income before Direct Taxes – Direct Taxes 
13 Final Income = Disposable Income +Transfers in Kind 
14 Final Income after Indirect Taxes= Final Income – Indirect Taxes 
15 The Gini coefficient for the developed countries used to improve until 60% after transfers, quoting the Spanish case, Calonge and Manresa 
found a Gini coefficient improved around 32% while the best mark for the Mexican case was 11.7% in 2002. 
16 Based on a wide range of credit taxes, subsidies and tax exemptions.   24
hardly is comparable with the developed countries, where these kinds of benefits are the principal source of 
redistribution income. 
 
Finally the indirect taxes have a negative incidence almost neutral on the redistribution income, for any studied 
year hardly reaches more than 0.25% its participation on the whole redistributive effect. In fact the indirect taxes 
registered a negative effect on the distribution income for the years 1989 and 2002. 
 
Table 11 
Factors Income before Disposable Final  Final Income
Income Direct Tax Income Income after Indirect Tax
1984 0.5318 0.5303 0.5002 0.4787 0.4783
0.0105 0.0104 0.0087 0.0084 0.0084
1989 0.6096 0.6052 0.5864 0.5511 0.5548
0.0150 0.0150 0.0136 0.0135 0.0138
1996 0.5517 0.5460 0.5230 0.4830 0.4823
0.0097 0.0096 0.0103 0.0098 0.0101
2002 0.5357 0.5277 0.5084 0.4730 0.4732
0.0048 0.0047 0.0047 0.0046 0.0047
Inc. before Direct Tax vs. Disposable Inc. vs. Final Income vs. Final Inc. Free Tax Ind. Vs. Factors Income Vs.
Factors Income = Inc. before Direct Tax = Disposable Income = Final Income = Final Inc. Free Tax Ind. =
Effect Monetary Trans. Direct Taxes Trans. In Kind Indirect Taxes Total
1984 0.0029 0.0568 0.0430 0.0008 0.1006
1989 0.0072 0.0310 0.0602 -0.0067 0.0898
1996 0.0102 0.0422 0.0764 0.0014 0.1257
2002 0.0150 0.0366 0.0696 -0.0004 0.1168
Note: Elaborated with different ENIGH issues
Year
Gini Coefficent per kind of National Income
Normalized Reynolds-Smolensky Index per Kind of Transfer and Tax
 
 
7.3The net fiscal balance 
The net fiscal balance calculus cast light about who are the principals favored and how much is transferred to the 
families though taxes and transfers. As well with this balance is possible to identify the net contributors.  To 
calculate the net balance, fist were calculated the net annuals transfers per capita in monetary terms, subtracting 
the vector of total tax payments from the vector of total transfers.     25
 
From a dynamic point  of  view, the Table 12 shows a  generalized  increase for the net receptors deciles  of 
transfers by the last 18 years. However such increase has not been homogeneous, while the fists 4 deciles have 
multiplied three times its transfers, the next 2 deciles (intermediate) have multiplied more than five times the 
amount received. This unbalance is favorable to the intermediate deciles, closer to medium class.  
 
Table 12 
Decil 1984 1989 1996 2002
1 14.41 26.54 36.13 40.29
2 11.61 16.44 27.87 29.62
3 7.63 9.99 23.10 23.92
4 5.72 6.90 18.66 19.35
5 2.20 1.91 12.97 14.24
6 1.58 0.63 10.72 11.59
7 -0.47 -2.01 7.05 6.92
8 -2.59 -5.35 1.89 1.14
9 -5.02 -8.34 -4.17 -1.65
10 -12.95 -13.85 -16.48 -18.06
*/ Free of any kind of tax oncluiding indirect taxes
Net Transfers respect the Family Final Income*
 
At the same time both as 7
th as 8
th have become net receptors while the 9
th decil has diminished its net transfers. 
All this evolution for the net transfers has deepened the protagonist role of the 10
th decil, due to the most of net 
transfers across families are supported by the this last decil. Is important to say that between 1996 and 2002 the 
medium  deciles  have  gained  weight  against  the  fist  deciles,  in  fact  the  2002  year  register  a  certain 
homogenization across the fists six deciles. However such homogenizations produce an unbalance favorable to 
the medium deciles compared with the unbalance favorable to 1989 where the fist four deciles concentrated 
91.6% of the net transfers. 
 
Contrasting  the  same  net  transfers  per  decil  against  itself  free  tax  final  income,  is  observed  a  increasing 
incidence favorable to the fists deciles, thus while the net transfers represented 14% of its final income by the 1
st 
decil to the 2002 year increased until 40%. In this sense the transfers in relative terms contrasted against the final 
income level are trending to favor the families with lower incomes. Is important to warn, that only the last two 
deciles are supporting the redistributive process across families and especially the last one, where 18% of its 
final  income  is  destined  to  the  redistribution.  Such  concentration  is  produced  by  the  worsening  of  income 
distribution in the last years.  
   26
By other side comparing the difference between the Family Factors Income and the Family Final Income after 
Indirect Taxes, is evident that the final income is increased considerably for the fist three deciles in 2002. Then, 
clearly is possible appreciate the good performance for the transfers and its positive effects on the final income, 
as  well  is  possible  to  notice  how  the  last  decil  is  supporting  almost  exclusively  the  redistributive  process 




Decil 1984 1989 1996 2002
1 16.83 36.13 56.57 67.48
2 13.13 19.68 38.63 42.08
3 8.27 11.10 30.04 31.44
4 6.07 7.41 22.95 23.99
5 2.25 1.95 14.90 16.60
6 1.61 0.63 12.01 13.10
7 -0.47 -1.97 7.58 7.44
8 -2.52 -5.08 1.93 1.15
9 -4.78 -7.70 -4.00 -1.62
10 -11.46 -12.16 -14.15 -15.30
Note: Elaborated with ENIGH and National Accounts data
Difference between Free Tax Final Income
and Factors Income
 
Is quite unexpected how the income final improvements for the fist deciles is based on a relative modest share of 
transfers, which hardly represents 9.8% of the whole family final income during 1984 and 16.7% for the 2002. 
That means than just between 2.8% and 6.3% of the Whole Mexican Household Final Income is used to improve 
the economics position for the poorest families, in others words this is the solidarity degree across families or the 
share of the family final income really redistributive (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 























Transfers with Net Redistrubutive Effect
Share of Final Income Household used to improve the poorest decils
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Conclusions and comments 
Once finished the whole analysis tax-benefit incidence for the Mexican Family Income is possible to enhance 
some interesting points. Fist of all, the tax system has practically kept without change during the 18 years 
studied; In general the whole tax system is hardly progressive with a positive redistributive effect around 3.6% in 
2002 on the final family income. With an income tax really progressive and some tax like VAT regressive. Since 
the high income concentration, around 51% of the whole burden tax is paid just by the 10% richest of the 
population. Is clear than for a long term is not viable this burden tax. As well, since the low tax pressure is 
impossible to increase significant the social budget. That is why the country has to increase the tax collect, where 
the principal target to reforms has to be the personal income tax, especially to avoid the tax evasion. 
 
Respect the benefit incidence both as transfers in kind as monetary transfers have had a good performance during 
the period, where their redistributive effect on the final family incomes has increased continuously. But at the 
same time their redistributive effect is insufficient in accordance with the country necessities. For the Mexican 
case the transfers in kind have had a protagonist role, while the monetary transfers are secondary, this fact shows 
a low level of development of the welfare state, where for industrialized countries the monetary transfers are the 
principal  distributive element. In this sense is necessary  to increase the  social expenditure, to privilege the 
progressive program and to re-formulate some social institution, for example to universalize the social security, 
medical  care  and  education.  As  well  is  necessary  to  correct  o  disappear  the  inefficient  programs  like  the 
electricity subsidy, scholarships and pensions. 
 
Finally the whole redistributive effect produced by the tax system and public transfers on the final family income 
has been increasing during the time, that effect for 2002 was 11.7%. Comparing against developed countries this 
value seems quite poor, because those countries can improve their income distribution between 40% and 60%. 
At lees is possible to stress that the public transfers performance is following the right way. Since, only between 
2.8 and 6.3% of the whole Mexican household final income is redistributive across families, put in evidence the 
low degree of solidarity across families, and therefore the poor results obtained by the public policies to make 
income redistribution.   
Thus, in accordance with the results is necessary to re-make all the public policies and to reform the institutions 
involved
17
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